KALAPANI AND THE CHANGING CONTOURS OF INDIA-NEPAL RELATIONS

 KALAPANI  AND  THE  CHANGING  CONTOURS OF INDIA-NEPAL RELATIONS

 Lhamu Tshering Bhutia     

 Department of Political Science Lady Brabourne College, Kolkata Email: lhamutbhutia.06@gmail.com

 Abstract

India  and  Nepal  share a  historically deep and multidimensional relationship,  reinforced by cultural, religious, and geographic linkages, as well as an open border under the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. While fostering integration and interdependence, structural asymmetries have fueled periodic tensions,  with  the  Kalapani dispute emerging as  a symbol of contested sovereignty and shifting strategic dynamics. In this context, the Kalapani territorial dispute has evolved into a potent symbol of contested sovereignty and national identity, exposing the deeper structural issues in an otherwise interdependent relationship and signalling a shift in the strategic calculus of India-Nepal bilateralism. By situating Kalapani within the larger framework of India’s evolving border relations, this article examines the historical roots, geopolitical significance, and regional implications of the Kalapani dispute, emphasising that border disputes profoundly shape bilateral trust and  narratives. 

The  study  highlights  the  dual importance  of  Kalapani as  both  a  site of  strategic control  over  vital  Himalayan  passes  and  as  a  potent  symbol  in  the  politics of sovereignty and nationalism. The study further underscores the imperative of sustained diplomacy and institutionalised cooperation to resolve the issue and strengthen stability along the Himalayan frontier. Keywords: India, Nepal, China, Relations, Kalapani, South Asia, IntroductionIndia  and  Nepal share  one  of  South  Asia’s  most enduring  and multidimensional  bilateral  relationships,  rooted  in  deep civilisational,  historical,  and  cultural  linkages  that  date  back  centuries.  Geographic  contiguity  is  complemented  by  an  intricate  web  of  religious,  linguistic,  and  familial  bonds,  reflected  in  shared  Hindu-Buddhist  traditions,  intermarriage  across communities, and overlapping ethnic identities in border regions such as the Terai and Indo-Gangetic  plains.  The  open  border  framework,  institutionalised  through  the  1950  Treaty  of  Peace and Friendship, has enabled restricted cross-border mobility, fostering social integration and mutual economic independence. Politically, India has exerted substantial influence over Nepal’s modern state-building processes, from backing democratic institutions to supporting post-conflict reconstruction. However, structural asymmetries in size, economic capacity, and strategic leverage have periodically generated tensions, with Nepal often seeking to recalibrate the terms of engagement. In this context, the Kalapani territorial dispute has evolved into a potent

A Bi-annual  South Asian Journal of Research & Innovation /  Vol: 12 | Issue 2 | July: 2025 | ISSN: 2392-495054symbol of contested sovereignty and national identity, exposing the deeper structural issues in an otherwise interdependent relationship and signalling a shift in the strategic calculus of India-Nepal bilateralism. India-Nepal ties illustrate the broader transformation of India’s societal interactions and  border  politics.  While  civilisational and  cultural  linkages  remain a  durable  foundation,  shifting territorial sensitivities, evolving geopolitical alignments, and the changes in perceptions are redefining the contours of engagement. The trajectory of this relationship will ultimately depend on whether both sides can transform borders from zones of contestation into platforms of cooperation, which will be essential for India and Nepal to sustain their unique relationship and contribute to stability in South Asia.

The  origin  and  evolution  of  the  Kalapani  dispute are  deeply  rooted  in  the  legacy  of  the  1816  Treaty of Sugauli, a geopolitical settlement that reshaped the Himalayan frontier and delineated the  territorial  contours  of  the  modern  Nepali  state.  The  1816  Treaty  was  signed  between  the  Kingdom of Nepal and the British East India Company following the conclusion of the Anglo-Nepalese War (1814-1816). Nepal’s defeat in the Anglo-Nepalese War culminated in the loss of nearly one-third of its territory across the eastern,  western,  and southern frontiers.

This marked one of the most significant territorial losses in Nepal’s history, reshaping its geopolitical landscape and diminishing its strategic depth in the Himalayan region. Following the British withdrawal, India and Nepal entered a new phase of engagement marked by the signing of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which replaced earlier agreements but left unresolved the fundamental question of the Kali River's origin (Bhattarai, 2024). This ambiguity lies at the heart of the Kalapani dispute, encompassing approximately 35 square kilometres of contested territory. While the 1816 Treaty established the Kali River as Nepal’s western boundary, it left its source undefined. Nepal identifies the river’s origin at Limpiyadhura, claiming Kalapani, Limpiyadhura, and Lipulekh, while India locates it further upstream, placing the area within its jurisdiction. In both narratives, Kalapani is firmly projected as integral to their respective sovereign claims (Kumar & Thakur, 2024). Disputes over rivers in South Asia underscore their significance as both vital resources for survival and natural demarcations of territorial borders. Colonial-era treaties left ambiguities that continue to fuel contestation, as seen in the Indus and Teesta water-sharing issues with Pakistan and Bangladesh. The Kali River similarly occupies a central role in defining the India-Nepal boundary.

The Kalapani dispute becomes more complex with the involvement of the Lipulekh Pass, a strategically significant corridor situated at the tri-junction of India, Nepal, and China. While India leverages the pass for cross-border connectivity and strategic depth, Nepal views its exclusion from related agreements as an erosion of sovereignty (Thakur & Kumar, 2022). Attempts at institutional resolution, such as the Joint Technical Boundary Committee (1981), failed to settle the issue, leaving Kalapani a persistent fault line in bilateral relations and a pressure point within the wider Sino-Indian strategic rivalry (Baral, 2018).

 While the India-Nepal Joint Technical Boundary Committee resolved nearly 97% of the border, the remaining 3%, including Kalapani-Limpiyadhura (370 km²), Susta (24 km²), and several other scattered pockets, totalling roughly 606 km², remains unsettled.The dispute persists largely due to A Bi-annual  South Asian Journal of Research & Innovation /  Vol: 12 | Issue 2 | July: 2025  | ISSN: 2392-495055the limited and contested access to historical maps and documents.

 Both India and Nepal rely on colonial-era cartographic records and treaties, such as the 1816 Treaty of Sugauli, to substantiate their claims, yet the interpretation of these documents varies significantly (Nayak, 2020). This perpetuates mistrust, thereby obstructing a definitive settlement of the boundary question. This cartographic ambiguity is further entangled in regional geopolitics, as Nepal’s territorial claims intersect  with  India’s  strategic  concerns  along  the  Himalayan  region  and  China’s  growing influence, making the dispute not merely a bilateral issue but a wider geopolitical flashpoint. The Politicisation and Resurgence of the Kalapani DisputeBefore the 1990s, during the Panchayat era, the Kalapani dispute remained largely absent from public debate, as foreign policy was managed by the monarchy with limited scope for scrutiny or public engagement. The democratic transition of the 1990s, however, reframed it as a sovereignty concern, with Khum Bahadur Khadka’s 1998 parliamentary intervention politicising India’s military  presence.  Since  then,  Kalapani  has  become  a  recurring  theme  in  Nepal’s  democratic  trajectory, shaping public perceptions and exerting a significant influence on India-Nepal diplomatic interactions (Kumar, 2024). In recent years, particularly since 2019, the Kalapani dispute has regained  prominence  due  to  three  critical  developments. 

 First,  following  India’s  abrogation  of  Article 370 in August 2019 and the subsequent reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir to Union Territories,  New  Delhi  issued  new  political  maps  that  depicted the  Kalapani  region  as  part  of  Indian territory. This move provoked sharp reactions in Kathmandu, where political leaders and the  public  viewed  it  as  an  assertion  of  unilateral  cartographic  control  over  contested  territory.  Second, India inaugurated a new road through the Lipulekh pass in order to facilitate pilgrimages and enhance connectivity with Tibet. While strategically significant for India, this development was  perceived  in  Nepal  as  a  direct  encroachment  on  its  sovereignty,  sparking  protests  and  deepening mistrust between the two countries. 

 In retaliation, Nepal released an official map depicting the disputed region as part of its territory (Aryal & Bharti, 2022). Third, during the 24thround of the Special Representatives dialogue on boundary issues between India and China, the two sides reached an understanding to reopen the Lipulekh pass as a means of improving cross-border trade and connectivity. However, the decision carries implications beyond the India-China framework. For Nepal, the agreement was untenable as it was concluded without its consultation, despite the pass lying in a disputed territory claimed by Nepal. This development has been seen in  Kathmandu  as  an  infringement  upon  its  sovereign  interests,  thereby  adding  another  layer  of  complexity to the already contentious Kalapani dispute (Giri, 2025).

 Kalapani and the Changing Contours of India-Nepal Relations. While Nepal’s  political  landscape  remains  fragmented,  territorial  disputes,  particularly  over  Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura, have emerged as a point of consensus among rival factions.  The  need  to  safeguard  national  sovereignty  often  overrides  ideological  differences,  and  Nepal  is  no  exception,  with  political  parties  presenting  a  united  front  in  the  public  sphere.  Nepali media and civil society portray India as an encroaching power, continuously highlighting historical imbalances in bilateral relations. This interplay of political unity and public discourse further amplifies the prevailing anti-India sentiment (Behera et al, 2024). This dynamic has eroded A Bi-annual  South Asian Journal of Research & Innovation /  Vol: 12 | Issue 2 | July: 2025 | ISSN: 2392-495056 goodwill and undermined India’s Neighbourhood Policy, reducing the scope for a stable, forward-looking bilateral engagement.

 Moreover,  the  Kalpani  dispute extends beyond a  bilateral territorial  disagreement  as  it  carries  wider regional implications for the security framework of South Asia. Situated at the tri-junction of India, Nepal, and China, Kalapani occupies a strategically sensitive frontier whose importance was heightened in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War. India’s continued military presence in Kalapani, originally sanctioned after the 1962 war, highlights its strategic utility as both a buffer against China and a control point over the Lipulekh corridor, reinforcing India’s northern security calculus  while  intensifying  Nepal’s sovereignty concerns.  Although  Nepal  has  raised  concerns  over encroachments along other sections of its borders, the Kalapani dispute stands apart, as the continued presence of Indian military personnel in the area has significantly increased nationalist sentiments.

 For India, therefore, Kalapani holds strategic significance as it provides a critical vantage point for monitoring Chinese military movements along Nepal’s border with Tibet, making it integral to its northern security arrangement. While for Nepal, the territory constitutes a core question of sovereignty and national identity, making its control not merely a territorial claim but also a matter of political legitimacy and national pride. Such contrasting interpretations have consistently exacerbated diplomatic frictions between the two countries (Kumar & Thakur, 2024)At the regional level, the dispute complicates India-Nepal relations by increasing distrust and suspicion, thereby undermining the prospects for meaningful regional cooperation in South Asia, including the already fragile institutional mechanisms such as SAARC. Simultaneously, the dispute is also deeply embedded within the wider strategic dynamics of the India-China rivalry.

 Beijing’s growing infrastructural and military presence along the Himalayan region has increased New  Delhi’s  anxieties  about  potential  territorial incursions,  compelling  India  to reinforce its  northern  security posture. China’s growing influence in Nepal has complicated the Kalapani dispute by altering its strategic context. Once a bilateral issue, it now intersects with Sino-Indian rivalry as Beijing’s investments under the Belt and Road Initiative, political engagement, and infrastructure projects give Nepal greater confidence in asserting its claims.

 Although China avoids openly supporting Nepal, its influence reinforces Indian apprehensions and intensifies the strategic sensitivity of the trijunction (Thakur & Kumar, 2022). Therefore, the Kalapani dispute has altered the trajectory of India-Nepal relations by shifting them  from a  cooperative  framework  rooted  in  historical  and  cultural  affinities  toward  one defined  by  mistrust  and  strategic  contestation.  For  Nepal,  the  issue  has  become  a  rallying point  for  sovereignty  and  national  identity,  uniting  otherwise  divided  political  factions  and  reinforcing anti-India sentiment. For India, however, Kalapani remains a non-negotiable security imperative tied to its broader China strategy.

 This clash of perceptions shifts the relationship into a more adversarial space, where territorial disputes overshadow cultural and economic ties. The dispute also internationalises the bilateral relationship, as China’s proximity amplifies both Nepal’s assertiveness and India’s security anxieties. Therefore, these shifts reflect a move from predominantly cooperative and asymmetrical engagement to a more contested and strategically complex  relationship,  highlighting  how  bilateral  ties  adapt  to  changing  domestic  and  regional  contexts.

 A Bi-annual  South Asian Journal of Research & Innovation /  Vol: 12 | Issue 2 | July: 2025  | ISSN: 2392-495057ConclusionThe  Kalapani  dispute,  though  strategically  significant,  remains  constrained  by  structural limitations; the contested area spans only a few square kilometres of the trijunction of India, Nepal, and China, and holds limited economic value beyond its geographic significance. While symbolically  powerful  in  Nepal’s  domestic  politics,  the  dispute  largely  functions  as  a  tool  for  nationalist  mobilisation  rather  than  as  a  practical  foreign  policy  instrument. 

 Moreover,  Nepal  lacks the diplomatic or military leverage to alter the status quo, resulting in a prolonged stalemate. However, if the dispute remains unresolved, it carries implications for India’s broader regional and global ambitions, particularly its aspirations to be recognised as a credible regional and rising major power. As India envisions itself as a Viksit Bharat (Developed India) by 2047, unresolved border disputes pose a significant strategic challenge. At the regional level, India has long sought to use its Neighbourhood First Policy on the basis of trust, stability, and developmental partnerships with  immediate  neighbours.  Therefore,  persistent  territorial  tensions  with  neighbours  such  as  Nepal, China, and Pakistan not only undermine India’s regional credibility but also constrain its ability to project itself as a responsible and stabilising force in South Asia.

 At the global level, India’s ability to project itself as a responsible power is linked to how it manages its immediate periphery. Unresolved disputes like Kalapani expose vulnerabilities in India’s regional leadership and raise questions about its ability to effectively manage its immediate neighbourhood, a critical prerequisite for achieving the status of a great power. Furthermore, overlooking Nepal’s concerns undermines India’s traditional influence in Kathmandu, especially as China expands its footprint through infrastructure, trade, and political engagement. Therefore, addressing these issues through sustained diplomacy, confidence-building, and equitable negotiation is not merely a bilateral necessity but also a strategic necessity for India’s broader ambition to establish itself as a leading power in the global order.

 Resolving the Kalapani dispute demands a balanced strategy rooted in historical understanding, mutual respect, and pragmatic diplomacy. Confidence-building measures such as joint boundary surveys, transparent map-sharing, and structured negotiations could build trust. A negotiated settlement would not only restore India-Nepal trust but also contribute to regional stability in South Asia, offering a precedent for constructive conflict management amid intensifying Sino-Indian competition in the Himalayas. ReferencesAryal, S.K., & Bharti, S.S. (2022).

 Comparison of Indian and Nepalese media on nepal’s new political map. Asian Politics and Policy. Volume 14, Issue 1. 134-138. Baral, T.N. (2018). Border disputes and its impact on bilateral relations: a case study of Nepal-India international  border  management.  Journal  of  APF  Command  and  Staff  College.  Volume 1, Issue 1. 28-36. Behera, A., Nayak, G., & Hari, P. S. (2024). Making sense of Nepal’s Nationalism: Implications for the India-Nepal relationship. India Quarterly. Volume 80, Issue 1. 55-71. Bhattarai, Richa. (2024). Nepal-India territorial dispute and national identity: a qualitative study of the understanding of Nepali youth living in the United States. Multilingual Academic Journal of Education and Social Sciences. Volume 12, Issue 1. 68-93.

 A Bi-annual  South Asian Journal of Research & Innovation /  Vol: 12 | Issue 2 | July: 2025 | ISSN: 2392-495058Giri, Anil.  (2025, August  22). 

 Nepal  leaders  unite  to  denounce  India-China  deal  on  Lipulekh. The Kathmandu   Post.https://kathmandupost.com/politics/2025/08/22/nepal-leaders-unite-to-denounce-india-china-deal-on-lipulekh. Kumar, J. (2024). India-Nepal border disputes & the Kalapani issue.

 Vivekananda International Foundation. https://www.vifindia.org/print/13197. Thakur, H.K.& Kumar, R. (2022).

 Rivers, geostrategy and state sovereignty: Understanding the Kalapani dispute and its geopolitical implications for India and Nepal. Kurdish Studies. Volume. 10. Issue No. 1. 204-212. Kumar, R. & Thakur, H.K. (2024).

 The Kalpani River dispute: a strategic and diplomatic conundrum for India and Nepal. International Journal of Applied Social Science. Volume 11 (11 & 12). 596-604. Nayak,  Sohini.  (2020). 

 India and  Nepal’s  Kalapani border dispute: An explainer. ORF  issue brief.  Issue   No.   356.   Observer   Research   Foundation.   https://www.orfonline.org/public/uploads/posts/pdf/20230524163856

 

Key Countries and Regional Groupings

 Key Countries and Regional Groupings

The Indo-Pacific is a vast, interconnected region spanning from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, generally encompassing around 40 countries and economies, including Australia, India, Japan, Southeast Asia (ASEAN), and Pacific Island nations. It is defined by strategic, economic, and security relationships, often acting as a new geographic framework replacing "Asia-Pacific". [1, 2, 3]

Key Countries and Regional Groupings

Based on various strategic definitions as of mid-2026, the key countries included are:

• Southeast Asia (ASEAN): Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.
• East Asia: Japan, People's Republic of China (PRC), Republic of Korea (ROK/South Korea), Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK/North Korea), Taiwan.
• South Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.
• Oceania & Pacific: Australia, New Zealand, and 14 Pacific Island nations.
• Other Key Actors: United States (due to its Pacific territories and strong alliance network). [1, 2, 3, 4]

Strategic Groupings

The region is often described through key geopolitical, security, and economic partnerships: [1, 2, 3]

• The Quad: Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.
• AUKUS: Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States.
• ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

The region is characterized by high strategic importance and rising defense spending, with countries like Japan, Australia, and the U.S. seeking to maintain a "free and open Indo-Pacific" to counter expanding Chinese influence. [1, 2, 3]

Choosing change

 Choosing change

Gagan Thapa’s rise through the ranks was neither a fluke nor was it blessed by someone at the top.

https://kathmandupost.com/columns/2026/02/04/choosing-change

Deepak Thapa

Published at : February 4, 2026

Updated at : February 5, 2026 06:48

The independent voter! That bane of psephologists, the fence-sitter, the one who does not know whether they are coming or going, and with that metaphorical smirk that keeps everyone guessing. That is what I used to think of this tribe until I went over my own record to realise I was squarely one of them.

My frustration with the unaffiliated voter, of course, has to do with countries where electoral surveys take place periodically, usually the more mature democracies. Thus, for instance, in the context of the West, I would often wonder why these people could not take a stand, either for the left or the right. Especially when the contrast between the two sides has always been quite stark. Granted that the equation has flipped nowadays, with the working class boosting the votes of the populist right even as those with higher education have hewn more towards the centre-left. The choice, though, remains between apples and oranges.

In my defence, I should say that we never did have the benefit of such clear-cut distinctions. When we voted for the first time in 1991, even though the retrograde Rastriya Prajatantra Party already existed as two factions, the main competitors were the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML. The former represented the traditionalists even as it ostensibly claimed democratic socialism as its guiding ideology. Likewise, the UML was ostensibly a revolutionary force but had come around to accepting a similar political platform. A faction of the extreme left that later became the Maoists was somewhat visible as well, but nowhere near challenging the Congress–UML duopoly. And thus, it has remained, notwithstanding the post-2006 churnings that have brought in many other political players into the fray: some national, some regional.

I live in Kathmandu’s constituency no 1, which for various reasons has come to be viewed as a prestigious seat and all sorts of characters have staked their political futures there. As someone whose only firm conviction has been not to back any party or individual advocating for the monarchy in any manner, I have voted for parties across the spectrum. The infuriating independent that I am, the choice has sometimes been based on the identity of the individual candidate, sometimes the party, and even on who stood the best chance of beating a pro-king candidate.

This time around, though, I know I will be voting for the NC candidate in Kathmandu–1, Prabal Thapa. I had never heard of the man till his name popped up in the news. That is immaterial. He is getting my vote because he represents the NC, and by extension, Gagan Thapa (no relation of mine, by the way).

Rooting for Gagan Thapa

Events have moved quickly since Gagan Thapa’s elevation to the highest post of the Congress in mid-January. But it was striking that compared to the celebratory and hopeful mood at the party’s special convention that elected Thapa, how off-putting it was seeing the hoary faces of the Sher Bahadur Deuba faction of the central working committee as they listlessly tried to counter the revolt. I could not be the only one who felt that those individuals represented everything that had gone wrong with our politics over the past 35 years. They had outlived their political lives.

Gagan Thapa’s political trajectory is well known. From a young student leader pelting stones in the movement against King Gyanendra’s takeover in 2002 to being among the first to advocate for the abolition of the monarchy a couple of years later, to his tenure as a parliamentarian and minister, and then general secretary of the party, he has jumped from strength to strength. His ouster of Deuba, who refused to fade away into dignified retirement, was the denouement.

Gagan Thapa’s rapid rise through the ranks was neither a fluke nor did it come about through someone’s blessing. In fact, both Girija Prasad Koirala and Deuba tried unsuccessfully to stymie his rise.

There has always been a certain dynamism about Gagan Thapa. The way he engages on a range of topics is evidence of an inquisitive mind. He is among the best-informed politicians we have, which could not have come about without a committed perseverance to continue learning. He does have his detractors, sometimes ill-founded, but his brief tenure as health minister showed him to be a visionary politician willing to take risks and also capable of delivering. Most importantly, I believe he has the integrity to lead the country to a better future, the kind of integrity that led him (and his fellow general secretary Bishwa Prakash Sharma) to immediately take responsibility for being party to enabling the conditions that led to the Gen Z movement, and resolving to do better going forward.

Generational hope

That kind of trust does not come easy to those of us who have experienced euphoria at least three times in as many decades—in 1990, following the end of the Panchayat autocracy; in 2006, that spelt the end of the Maoist insurgency and the promised of a New Nepal; and once again, albeit somewhat mutedly, in 2015, with the adoption of the constitution of a federal Nepal. Although each time our hopes have been dashed, we have no choice but to dare to dream yet again. And, at this juncture, I would rather dream of Gagan Thapa being at the helm than anyone else.

Consider the alternatives. The duo of Pushpa Kamal Dahal and Madhav Kumar Nepal inspire not a whit. The Madhesh-based parties have come together yet again to present a united front that is likely to last till the results are announced. Kulman Ghising’s outfit has spluttered even before starting. The Rastriya Prajatantra Party is there somewhere. The UML is still under the iron grip of Oli, and so, the less said of it, the better. The Rastriya Swatantra Party appears buoyed by the crowds Balendra Shah is able to draw, but we are yet to know if that is a political party or a coalition of disparate individuals seeking comfort in numbers. A smattering of other hopefuls are inconsequential.

Given this plethora of players all vying for an electorate that is in a sour mood, the upcoming elections stand out also for being perhaps the first in which no one has dared come up with any prognosis. Even if they ultimately turn out to be wrong—as they were in 2008—political pundits are quick to point out trends. But their silence this time is quite revealing.

That is what the Congress party under Gagan Thapa is up against. It had the momentum for some time although seems to be wasting away as election fever gears up. Not all the Congress candidates inspire confidence either; some unsavoury holdovers from the ‘old’ Congress have also been fielded.

It is entirely possible that the Nepali Congress may not get a shot at forming the government. Were that to happen, it could serve as an opportunity to rejuvenate the grand old party from the grassroots. For unless someone as promising emerges in the political firmament, it is my firm belief that Gagan Thapa represents the last hope for a generation—whether he reaches the top now or in the next election cycle.

---

Deepak Thapa

Deepak Thapa has been a fortnightly columnist with The Kathmandu Post since 2009, writing on a range of topical social and political issues.

https://kathmandupost.com/columns/2026/02/04/choosing-change

Peace in Gaza

 As of early May 2026, the situation in Gaza is characterized as a "neither war nor peace" scenario, defined by a highly fragile, internationally-brokered ceasefire that began on October 10, 2025. While high-intensity, full-scale combat has reduced compared to the 2023–2025 period, daily violence persists, humanitarian conditions remain desperate, and the peace process is currently stalled. [1, 2, 3]

Current Situation in Gaza (May 2026):

• Stalled Peace Negotiations: Negotiations regarding the disarmament of Hamas and the transition to a permanent peace plan (often referred to as a 20-point U.S.-mediated plan) have reached a deadlock, with reports that Israel is considering resuming military operations.
• Ongoing Violence: Despite the ceasefire, hundreds of Palestinians have been killed since October 2025 by Israeli airstrikes and shelling, with reports of near-daily strikes.
• Humanitarian Crisis: The situation remains dire with over 90% of the population displaced, living in tents or ruins. Over 72,000 Palestinians have been killed since October 2023, according to reports from the Gaza Health Ministry and OCHA.
• Failed Infrastructure: Sanitation and health systems have largely collapsed, with ongoing shortages of food, fuel, and medical supplies. Rubble removal is delayed due to restrictions on importing machinery.
• Divided Control: While an international "Board of Peace" is meant to oversee transition, Hamas has continued to reassert local authority in some areas. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]

Chances of Peace:
The prospects for long-term or "forever" peace are viewed as extremely challenging due to deeply entrenched issues. While the Oct 2025 agreement was meant to initiate a recovery phase, it has become a temporary truce rather than a final settlement. [1]

• Obstacles: Key hurdles include Hamas's refusal to disarm, Israeli demands for total security control, lack of political agreement on the future governance of Gaza, and high levels of mistrust.
• International Efforts: There is a "[Board of Peace]" involved in attempting to move to a second phase of the peace plan, involving reconstruction under international supervision.
• Fragility: The situation is highly vulnerable, with risks of renewed full-scale war if the stalled talks do not reach a breakthrough regarding disarmament. [1, 2, 3, 4]

While international actors continue to push for a sustainable, long-term political solution based on a two-state framework, the immediate situation on the ground remains volatile with no immediate guarantee of lasting peace. [1, 2]

What are the chances of peace in Lebanon?

 As of May 2026, Lebanon is in a state of high-risk conflict, experiencing intense fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, resulting in massive displacement and significant casualties, though fragile diplomatic efforts for peace are ongoing. A U.S.-brokered ceasefire is in place but remains unstable, threatened by continued strikes and deep political divisions. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]

Current Situation in Lebanon (May 2026)

• Active Conflict: Israel has continued airstrikes and initiated a ground invasion in southern Lebanon, creating a "security buffer zone".
• Casualties & Displacement: Over 1.2 million people are displaced, with at least 2,000 killed and 6,000 injured since the conflict escalated in March.
• Political Instability: The Lebanese government is attempting to curb Hezbollah’s military activity in line with international pressure, but this has caused severe domestic tension.
• Hezbollah Status: Despite being weakened by the assassination of its leadership, Hezbollah remains an influential, armed force embedded in Lebanese society, opposing disarmament.
• Economic Crisis: The ongoing security crisis exacerbates a deep, pre-existing economic collapse. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]

Chances of Peace

• Historic Talks: For the first time since 1993,direct negotiations between Israel and Lebanon are taking place, seen as a potential path toward a long-term deal.
• Obstacles: Peace is hindered by Hezbollah's refusal to disarm, Iran's involvement, and the difficulty of the Lebanese army reclaiming control in the south.
• Outcome Outlook: While U.S. officials consider a peace deal "achievable" by addressing the "Hezbollah problem," local observers in southern Lebanon are skeptical, and a potential civil war remains a concern. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

The situation is characterized by a fragile pause that could lead to either a brokered settlement or a renewed, broader conflict. [1, 2]

Major Security and Justice Problems in Nepal

 Security and justice in Nepal are heavily challenged by political interference, corruption, and a weak rule of law, undermining public trust in institutions. Key issues include widespread impunity, high levels of crime, severe gender-based violence, and poor access to justice for marginalized communities. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

Major Security and Justice Problems in Nepal:

• Political Interference & Corruption: The police and judiciary face significant political interference, with politicians often influencing promotions and transfers to serve their interests. This, along with police impunity, has fueled a low conviction rate for serious crimes, including corruption.
• High Levels of Crime & Impunity: The security situation is worsening in many areas due to the rise of armed groups and organized crime. Criminals often avoid justice, and in some instances, police personnel are accused of protecting criminals.
• Gender-Based Violence & Insecurity: Violence against women, including rape and domestic violence, remains a critical issue with high levels of impunity. Women often feel unsafe and lack confidence in the justice system's ability to protect them.
• Weak Judicial System: The courts face immense pressure from both the executive branch and political entities, leading to compromised independence, lack of accountability, and in some areas, the emergence of parallel or "informal" justice mechanisms, such as Maoist courts.
• Resource Constraints: The Nepal Police, responsible for maintaining law and order, lack sufficient human, financial, and material resources to function effectively.
• Marginalized Communities & Access: People in remote regions, as well as lower-caste and marginalized groups, face substantial barriers in accessing justice. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]

These challenges are amplified by the long-term, slow transition from conflict to peace. Efforts to reform the sector have been hindered by weak implementation, even though there is a growing recognition of the need for change. [1, 2]