How a State relates to a
Nation and to a territory according to the phenomenological investigation of
Edith Stein
State in Edith Stein’s An Investigation Concerning the state, is equivalent to
sovereignty. Its chief characteristic is that it can
legislate for itself. It occurs when a certain level of social organisation has been reached either by
diverse persons and communities or actual or emerging ethnic communities. Stein uses the
word Volk which can mean “people” or
“ethnic community” or even “nation”, yet the
translator Marianne Sawicki notes that Stein reserves a special meaning for the German term used to
describe nation. A people develops ethnically when it possesses its own
distinctive culture, that culture being an ability to reflect the whole world
in its own terms and through its own
self-standing. Stein finds in this cultural autonomy a highlighting of the connection between state
and its people who being creative and distinct in that creativity requires a form of
organisation that will legislate their own lawfulness. State, in return, requires that creativity to
direct its organisational activity and to inform the content of such. Cultural autonomy then seems to be
a material basis towards the right to self-legislation. Nationhood arises from the
people after maturity has been reached. It occurs when the people begin to celebrate their
collective life. Stein uses the term Gemeinschafts-bewuβtsein
to mean consciousness of community i.e.
consciousness whose object is community as distinct from the term Gemeinschaftbewuβtsein to mean community consciousness. The term “consciousness of
community” is used in Stein’s description of nation. It denotes a “we” that acts and to
whom things happen, where we see each other in terms of a collectivity. This “we-ness” is
presupposed by state and is the basis for the state’s history as a shared history. The
consciousness of community which is proper to the people is raised to reflective clarity in nation
becoming an image of nation’s uniqueness. However in the people this uniqueness is not thought
out but presupposed in its actions and life accomplishments. Therefore, Stein states, nation
can only come from peoples and peoples tend to develop into nation. State does not depend on there being nation,
yet for the sake of the resilience of the people, it is in the
interest of state that national sentiment should reach a certain level. This is specified in terms
the desirability of a breakout of national sentiment should the open display of peoplehood be
thwarted.
The relationship of state to nation can
further be understood from Stein’s criticism of Rudolf Kjellén who held that nation receives its
mental content from the coalescence of state and that state then demands completion from the
essence of nation. The common denominator between state and nation is the people. As
state is the expression of a people’s cultural autonomy and its will for self-legislation
by which it is sovereign, the people does not need to be completed. Kjellén characterises this
process in terms of an analogy between ‘mind’ and ‘nature’, but Stein points out, after
mentioning his lack of specification for these terms, that all community is a mental activity and that
while a people has its natural basis, state does too. The inference is that the analogy between
‘mind’ and ‘nature’ lacks a basis in the actual relationship between state and nation. To
conclude otherwise would be to make state in some way dependent on nation. In nation,
aspects of national life are celebrated e.g. its poetry or music. A state which is bound
together merely by loyalty, ties of duty and observance of the law, cannot attain to
that existential authenticity that state arising out of ethnic community possesses. Kelljén has
made nations equivalent to individuals bound by the aforementioned conditions of loyalty and
duty to the laws. In criticising this view, Stein writes that in such a case, ethnic
community would be the product of the solidarity of the laws and duties of the state and would also
presuppose the state which is not true in the light of what she has elucidated concerning
ethnic community. Such a state would feel hollow and ephemeral without any centre of gravity. To
celebrate something is to place a value on it. In a people, individual and super-individual,
unity “is attested in the uniqueness of his or her attitude towards the whole world of values,
and it comes out in the coherence of all his or her works”.
State, however, is value-neutral. Stein writes that “As a state, the reign of
Satan can be just as perfect as the reign of God”.
The state is not bound by any moral code. Yet, in her criticism of Kelljén, she asks should a
certain type of reasonableness be ascribed to the state? Values are the prerogatives of human beings
and by extension of nation whereas state is astate of affairs or a stance.
Nation doesn’t need state to exist; a
greater factor seems to be the time needed for the maturation process of the
people to take place. Yet this begs the question where state is presiding over
an immature people consisting of non-ethnic persons and communities, to what
extent would such a state of affairs arise from the will of the people? It is
difficult not to see in such circumstances and
also in circumstances such as settlements
between warring factions after civil war, that large proportions of the people do not get to
express their will but suffer imposition. There is a
tendency in Stein to present the people in
a uniform and homogenous manner, while it may
instead be the will of the majority or the
will of the stronger. National sentiment can fluctuate
and Stein has remarked that the uniqueness
pertaining to nation needs cultivation.
Cultivation implies some trends are
encouraged while other trends are not. It has been seen
that the State, as expressive of the will
of the people, can legislate against what are perceived
of as undesirable trends.
Territory, according to Stein, is a
consequence of the bodily configuration or corporeality of the people belonging
to it. Initially, she analyses the issue with regard to corporeality and space.
The translator Marianne Sawicki notes that the word ‘Raum’, does not signify outer space but pertains to the physical
world. In this regard, Stein contrasts physical and mental territory taking
mind as that which has no extension in space. Perhaps it may be said that Stein
may be writing about an angelic mode of existence. However, the principle
remains true that such a state, composed entirely of mental persons, is
conceivable. It is pertinent to the issue she has sought to examine namely in
relation to Jellinek’s contention that a “portion of the surface of the earth”
is a constitutive factor of State. Such a community of minds that Stein posits
would be free from dependence on space in principle. Sawicki calls this a
thought experiment, however Stein concludes on the basis of the fact that such
a state can be conceived without logical contradiction, it follows that
territory is not part of the essence of what we mean by State. Rather, she goes
on to argue that, due to the bodily configuration of its people, state needs a
sovereign territory in order “to secure for itself the free disposition of the
mode of life of its citizens”, due to the fact that bodily existence implies
space. Without such a sovereign territory a risk would exist as to whether the
state as such could avoid falling into dependency on another state or not. Using
the example of highly organised nomadic groups, Stein argues that the sovereign
territory of a state does not always need to be formed by the same territory.
Thus a sovereign territory could be comprised by a portion of the surface of
the earth that is liable to change. A nomadic tribe can be recognised as a
state if there is sufficient, unclaimed space available to them. The danger
here is that the nomadic group, without available space, would become dependent
on the state whose sovereign territory they occupied. Stein also cites the
example of a people organised into a state stamped by the land. On leaving the
initial territory and resettling elsewhere, she writes the concrete pattern of
the state can change so much that a new state arises. She adds the caveat that this phenomenon does not
disprove that a state is bound up with a territory because she is talking about
specific state patterns. Stein does
concede however, that there are modes of dependence between the two that as
possibilities. She admits that state and territory can be linked but that
linkage is to be understood in terms of the individual’s physical being, thus
it is on that basis that she proceeds. That underlying principle receives its
pert formulation in “The state needs the land inasmuch as the citizens need
it”. Demand is related to people’s needs in terms of what demands are going to
be placed on the territory of the state. Stein illustrates this principle by
means of the idea of phantom beings who would need only space and light for the
actuality of their visual appearances. In contradistinction to these beings who
don’t rely on any material component for their unfolding, there are human
beings who are in need of material quality. This material quality is to be
found in the sovereign territory. Stein understands this aspect purely in terms
of bodily reality. She defines economy according to its original sense when
writes “economy is the organisation of the satisfaction of needs”. The land
must contain such materials in sufficient quantities to the individuals who
require them or materials whose conversion can satisfy that demand. The definition
of economy she argues for shows the reciprocal relationship between the
citizens and the land. As this fundamental relationship between the citizenry
and the land obtains according to this sense of economy, Stein enumerates three
possibilities that may come into action in the event of the raw materials of a
land not proving sufficient for the needs of its citizens. The first
possibility pertains to the finding of means to process the raw materials into
consumable ones. This normally means development of an aspect of technology
perhaps coupled with impetus from business and commerce. An example of such an
occurrence would be the harvesting of a state-owned forest to provide for more
material benefits. The second possibility is concerned with the acquisition of
new territory in response to any material deficit pertaining to the land.
Sawicki describes this process in terms of colonisation and annexation. The
third possibility is that the required materials can be obtained from the
sovereign territory of another state, yet she immediately points out that this
can run the risk of dependency on the other state unless a commercial two-way
factor is in play. Stein argues that there are no other alternatives hence this
is the constraint that the land puts on those who live on it. Stein describes
the quality of the land as “the motivational basis for the direction taken by
the activity of all those who inhabit it”. The course of action chosen
ultimately depends on the dispositions of the human beings who inhabit it.
Conquest reflects the path taken by those who possess physical power.
Intelligence and industry opts, according to Stein, for “a rational evaluation
of the products of the land”, while flexibility and mental sharpness will lead
to commerce. Initially, these dispositions are linked to geographical factors
belonging to a territory but Stein notes that natural foundations can be
completely identical, in which case personal disposition per se becomes the critical factor in determining which course of
action will arise. In other words the question as to whether this disposition
still depends on the nature of the land is left open. She notes that it would
no longer be in the form of motivation but would be viewed from the view-point
of causality. In this regard, Stein posits it as conceivable that an element or
elements of material nature, obtained from local nature and being constitutive
of one’s body, should exhibit an influence on one’s sentient being. Thus, in
this sense, character could be said to be a product of nature. However, the
psycho-physical aspects and implications of this issue cannot be expounded in
the present work. Marianne Sawicki, the translator, sees in Stein’s refusal to
cite any references to earlier work she had done on the subject, an indication
that she intended to do further work on the issues. Stein also point to the
fact of mental influence of nature upon a person, such as the influence on
one’s temperament of the character of the countryside. This effect, however, is
indeterminate due to the fact that the countryside may be such as it
necessitates the highest activeness. This is coupled with the recognition that
the very same countryside could possibly paralyse its inhabitant thus affording
them no opportunity to organise themselves and leaving them prey to conquerors.
Stein argues cogently as to why the land or
sovereign territory cannot be the natural basis of the state. Her reasoning is
due to the fact that the many human activities that take place on the land in
order to produce or process raw materials submits the land to human influence,
and so, can profoundly change it. She gives examples of such processes in
irrigation and planting. It follows then, strictly speaking, that geography,
whose subject matter is the earth’s surface, is not unqualifiedly a natural
science. This is due to the fact that many lands of the earth, due to human
cultivation, can no longer be viewed as natural per se. In this regard, the earth bears all the traces and marks of
what has transpired upon it in terms of human history. Thus the appeal to
sovereign territory, as a natural basis for the state is one that is without
foundation upon analysis. Referring to the possibility of studying phenomena
such as land and population in a natural-scientific manner, Stein concedes that
both are mixed with nature on the one hand and mind on the other. She points to
the natural-scientific method of extracting nature from the matter under
investigation. Sawicki elaborates on this by pointing out the cultural and
psychological influences that determines the phenomenon of nature, and without which,
nature can’t be found. The possibility of a natural-scientific investigation
into this question of nature depends very much on such an abstractive process.
Again this mix or close relation between territory and population is
demonstrated by what Stein writes about the economic situation as it pertains
to a state. The state can be “an economic subject”, in that it can be a
decision-maker and a participator in business activities. Alternatively, it can
leave such pursuits in the hands of individuals and private groups. As an
economic subject the state makes its own of the territory. The reciprocal
nature of the relationship between territory and population is given when she
notes different territories lend different characters to the people occupying
them in the same manner the landscape itself undergoes such changes when peoples
and state formations become detached from it. Such alteration may be said to be
a direct function and also by-product of the economy of the state. If the state
refrains from becoming an economic subject, Stein argues that it may still
retain the prerogative of regulating economic activity which pertains to
legality and the enjoining of certain practices and the forbidding of others in
law.
Towards the end of the section on state and
land, Stein considers the issues relating to the demarcation of a state’s
sovereign territory. She recognises geographic unity in two senses. The first
relates to a geographical area which is capable of satisfying the population’s
needs, hence this type of unity is not to be considered independently from
human activity. However, in the second, there is no reference to human activity
and the unity of the land is comprised by its mere shape. In a further sense
such a piece of land can be called a geographic individuality. Geographical
unity in the sense Stein alludes to comes from the writings of Karl Ritter who
pioneered the view that the earth was to be seen as one, individual organism
with a particular organisation the study of which was to be the object of
geography. He also held the view that the structure of each country determined
to a large extent, the historical progress of the nation. Stein writes that if
such geographical unity or individuality is intersected by the borders of
states, both parties will demand that the natural unity be restored or that a
legal unity should take effect. This is different from the situation where the
determining factor in the demarcation of the territory is the provision of
materials for the needs of the inhabiting population. In the situation, the
state acts from a condition of pre-existing harmony. If the territory is
inadequate to the extent of needs, Stein argues, failing the possibility of
converting and exploiting the available materials, then expansion is necessary
in order to avoid becoming dependent upon another state. The natural or legal
unity desired is may be different to the unity derived from the ability to
provide for the population’s needs. Even if geographic unity is taken without
reference to human activity upon it and merely viewed from the point of view of
its shape, this can be a factor in the demarcation of a state’s territory. Should
the unity be cut through, it would prove the relation between people and
territory in that a state can be comprised of many geographic units and can,
encompass many peoples. However, owing to the fact that the people are the
natural basis for a state, should a state cut through the unity of a people, in
a manner analogous to dividing up the countryside, such a state can create an irrendenta. An irrendenta is defined as ‘unredeemed’ from the point of view of a
state who wishes to annex a territory on ethnic community grounds. A state
which creates these conditions poses a risk to itself. Stein sees in this a
renunciation of the state’s natural basis. This relationship between sovereign
territory and the people is expanded on in Stein’s brief discussion of race.
She points to the influence the land exerts on individuals with gives rise to a
physical type which she designates as race. The size of the geographical unity
determines whether such physical types will develop into a people, or several
peoples, whereas a smaller geographical unit may one support tribes. Tribes,
however, if they blend into each other can become a people. Therefore, the size
of the geographical unit is important but from the point of view of forming a
people, the community involved must be capable of reflecting the world of
values from its own self-standing. In other words, it must be a cultural
personality in its own right. Stein acknowledges the type of geographical space
that can support several peoples and that the unity that pertains to these
peoples can fall under the concept of race. The unity in this case, is given by
type. This can give rise to a mental or cultural community. Sawicki notes that
the cultural sphere is the medium through which inter-racial sharing can take
place. This sphere can extend beyond the country of racial origin and even
beyond members of a race themselves.
Nation and state differ in form in that one
is a way of viewing, a perception of a people of themselves and the conditions
and activities belonging to them whereas state is an activity of legislating
for its own lawfulness. They differ also in content where state is comprised of
civil authority and positive law whereas nation is comprised of consciousness
of community and values. It is chiefly with regard to context that the optimal
relationship between nation and state occurs when they both co-exist and the
bond between people and state is mediated through nation. The cultural aspect
within nationhood makes us more positively disposed towards the state. Thus the
relationship between state and nation is not necessary but typical. Nor is the
state dependent on its sovereign territory in that the eidos of state can allow for a non-terrestrial state, thus
sovereign territory is not essential to that eidos. A state’s jurisdiction extends to each and every one of its
borders but borders are never fixed, they are always susceptible to change
while a state founds itself in law. The relationship between state and
territory transpires more in the relationship of state to people as people, not
as state or nation. The incidence of state with sovereign territory is frequent
however. Furthermore, the relationship between state and territory can be
potentially fractious as is evidenced by Stein’s positing of the option of
territorial expansion in order to meet the needs of the state’s population.
Ominously this has undertones of the infamous argument for Lebensraum made during World War Two when Germany looked to Russia
as a suitable geographical area to pursue the satisfaction of this perceived
national need. Sawicki rightly points out that Stein does not consider the
Malthusian option. She doesn’t consider mass emigration as solution either.
Thus the possibility remains constant that a state, in its quest for additional
raw materials to satisfy its populace, can constitute a danger to other states.
Bibliography
Stein, Edith, An Investigation Concerning the State, trans. by Marianne Sawicki
(ed.) (Washington Province of Recalced Carmelites Inc.: 2006)
