Human security and landmines

Human Security and Landmines: Building National Capability

Govind P. Thapa, PhD[1]


Background

‘Human security means protecting vital freedoms. It means protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations, building on their strengths and aspirations. It also means creating systems that give people the building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood. To do this, it offers two general strategies: protection and empowerment. Protection shields people from dangers. Empowerment enables people to develop their potential and become full participants in decision-making’ (Report of the UN Commission on Human Security, 2003). Security means ‘The quality or state of being secured’, ‘freedom from fear or anxiety’, ‘freedom from danger’ (Kanji, 2003). Kevin (1990) defines security as: ‘..a basic social process (a changing but integral component of all relationships), without which social life would be both meaningless and relatively dangerous’… ‘..cultural values, processes of sociation, integration and co-operation are likely to be more important determinants of real security than strong state systems which rest their power on the military or other forms of coercive capability’.
The advocates of the ‘broad’ concept of human security argue that the threat agenda should include hunger, disease and natural disasters because these kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined. Human security policy, they argue, should seek to protect people from these threats as well as from violence—violence of war— arms, landmines and IEDs. In its broadest definitions the human security agenda also incorporates social, political, economic insecurity and ‘threats to human dignity’. Amongst many threats to the life of human being; landmines, booby-traps, and IEDS are also prominent ones. As one Khmer Rouge general put it, a landmine is a perfect soldier: "Ever courageous, never sleeps, never misses." Landmines have been used on a massive scale since their development. It has been estimated that 400 million landmines have been sown since the beginning of the Second World War, including at least 65 million in the last 15 years (Stephen).
Currently 80 to 110 million are deployed in 64 countries around the world. The majority of countries most heavily contaminated with landmines are in the developing world (Jody). Landmines kill and wound over 20,000 people each year. The most heavily mine-affected countries in the world, according to a UN study, are: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Eritrea, Iraq, Mozambique, Namibia, Somalia, Nicaragua and Sudan. These 12 countries together account for almost 50 percent of the landmines currently deployed in the world and also suffer the highest number of landmines casualties (UN).Virtually all combatants use land-mines. Since 1975, land-mines have exploded under more than 1 million people and are currently thought to be killing 800 people a month. There seems little prospect of any end to the bloodshed.
Landmines, the ‘silent killers’, are of two basic types—antitank and anti-vehicle and antipersonnel. Antitank mines are larger and more powerful than antipersonnel mines. However, antipersonnel mines are the most common type of mine, yet the most difficult to find because they are small and often made of plastic. Antitank mines generally contain more metal than do antipersonnel mines and are thus more easily detectable by simple metal detectors. Both types are buried as close to the surface as possible and are found in a variety of soils and terrain--rocky or sandy soil, open fields, forested areas, steep terrain, jungle. For both types of mines, detonation is typically caused by pressure, although some are activated by a trip-wire or other mechanisms. Thus, a land-mine detector must do its job without having direct contact with a mine. It also must be able to locate all types of mines individually in a variety of environments.

Use of landmines, booby-traps and IEDs in Nepal

The ‘Peoples’ War’ was fought not politically—neutralizing the political ideology and agenda of opponents. It was not the ‘war’ of wits but the ‘war’ of violent means of using arms, landmines, booby traps and IEDs. The indiscriminate use of these landmines and IEDs resulted in the casualties of innocent people—especially women and children. The war was not fought strategically, tactically and methodically but entirely in wild and indiscriminate way without giving due regards for the lives of innocent people. The human rights principles and rules of war were utterly disregarded. In the decade-long ‘Peoples’ War’ of Nepal, landmines and booby traps were used erratically. Dangerous items of arms and ammunitions, landmines and IEDs were transported by means of public transports—buses, trucks, helicopters—even airplanes and trains were not spared. Innocent people were forcefully engaged to carry these materials at the risk of their own lives. These mines were stored in public and private property—like schools, government offices and other public utility facilities.
In an interview to ISN Security Watch, Brigadier General Lok Bahadur Thapa Magar, director of Engineers at the Nepal Army's Mine Action Coordinating Committee said: "The army planted 12,500 mines in the five years that it was called in. They were planted in 52 locations in 37 districts to protect security bases in remote areas. We used them for deterrence only, to compensate for our lack of troops and ammunition, and give soldiers confidence” (RAONLINE). The Nepal branch of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines says the organization has recorded around 1382 deaths caused by landmines since the rebels took up arms in 1996. Out of 4747 victims of landmines and explosions 3365 have survived (NCBL). These are the numbers of ‘direct victims’; there must be thousands and thousands of ‘indirect victims’ of landmines and explosives. We do not have the statistics of these victims yet and we have not bothered to collect.
During the decade-long ‘Peoples’ War’, mines and IEDs were laid down and abandoned indiscriminately over the jungles, pasture fields, farms, water spots, roads, bridges, culverts, and foot-tracks. In many situations unexploded ordnance (UXOs) are as lethal a legacy as landmines. These explosives were abandoned, unaccounted and unattended inviting hazards to the lives of common people. The degree of accountability from both sides—state and non-state party—was at zero level. Non-combatants were also targeted and victimized. Complete violations of national and international laws by state and non-state party were ‘regular’ practices. The recklessness in laying, marking and demining have cost lives of many army and police personnel inside their own 'protected' area—for example in April 2006, soldiers digging inside the perimeter of an army barracks in Tamghas, the capital of Gulmi district, detonated a mine, killing seven soldiers and injuring 10 others. The impacts of the landmines are numerous: social, economical, political, physical—loss of human life, dignity and rights, and erosion of rule of law.

Demining the Minefields

Landmines have been used so extensively because they are readily available, cheap and easy to use. While landmines are not hard to deploy, their removal is, however, painstakingly slow, dangerous and expensive. The biggest problem and challenge that Nepal faces today is in the sector of ‘demining of minefields’. Mine-detection technology has not kept pace with rapid developments in mines, which have made them more deadly and more difficult to trace(Jody). Various detection technologies are currently used, each with limits or flaws. Dogs and other "sniffers" have high ongoing expenses, are subject to fatigue, and can be fooled by masked scents. Metal detectors are sensitive to metal mines and firing pins but cannot reliably find plastic mines. Infrared detectors effectively detect recently placed mines, but they are expensive and limited to certain temperature conditions. Thermal neutron activation detectors are accurate but are large for field use, slow, and expensive. The manual demining process is a very slow, expensive and dangerous practice.
Landmine clearance is made even more difficult by an almost complete disregard for the stipulated mapping and recording of minefields. While the CCW requires the mapping of "preplanned" minefields, the term "preplanned" is not defined. Even if it were - given the few instances of minefields mapping and recording in the majority of conflicts of the past several decades - the provision would probably not be followed (Jody). Although Nepal Army claims to have records and mappings of the landmines, I have doubts on their claims. Nepal is not yet a party to any of the international conventions and treaties on landmines, therefore, violations of these provisions are considered as ‘no crime’, which is ridiculous. It is already late that Nepal makes laws and policy in compliant to the international treaties and conventions.

Strategy and Actions

On 26 May 2006, the government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) agreed to a bilateral cease-fire and a Code of Conduct that includes non-use of landmines. In our context, even after this agreement, no genuine, sincere and honest attempts have been exhibited by the state to take care of the mines and IEDs; in other words no sensitive responses shown towards human rights and security. Nepal does not have a formal program for dealing with mines and ERW. The RNA’s 14th Brigade, based in Kathmandu, has an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit using equipment and training provided by the UK. The Armed Police Force also has one EOD team in Kathmandu. Media reported operations by security forces to clear mines and other explosives in 21 districts during 2005.Official results of such operations were not available. The RNA’s EOD capacity comprises a holding unit in the capital and six bomb disposal teams, usually of six people each, deployed at each of the six regional divisional headquarters(ICBL).
The army’s EOD squad has the capacity to deal with the full range of explosive devices used by insurgents, but can be severely stretched by post-engagement clearance requirements. It does not have sufficient resources to undertake either survey or clearance operations addressing the needs of rural communities. The RNA’s strategic priorities were to keep Nepal’s roads and telecommunications infrastructure functioning, leaving little or no spare capacity to address wider social needs for clearance while the conflict continued(ICBL). The Nepal army lacks capability to cope effectively and urgently with the landmines and UXOs. So, Nepal needs to build capability to cope with these urgent issues.
Strengthening accountability is a fundamental objective for achieving effective service delivery. Accountability in security and justice sector reform is often conceived as primarily focusing on human rights, holding providers accountable for abuses and strengthening rights protection. Any mine action programme in Nepal will need to build upon the existing outreach and other programmes of the working group partners and other organizations. The partners in the Mine Risk Education Working Group (MREWG) agreed during formulating their draft strategy that it would not be useful or effective to create programming independently, in parallel or in isolation from current initiatives. Partners believe that mine action programming needs should be integrated with existing activities. Both the causes and the effects of the landmine crisis need to be addressed. The efforts need to include halting mine laying, production and stockpiling, clearing mined areas and helping landmine survivors. In this respect the ICBL recommends the following actions to be taken:
Remove mines from the ground;
Ensure that minefields are fenced off and marked and that communities receive education about mine risks;
Destroy mines in stockpiles;
Meet the needs of mine victims -- from emergency medical care and rehabilitation to programmes for socio-economic reintegration and recognised rights for people with disabilities;
Ensure that all countries joins the Mine Ban Treaty and undertake to never again produce, use or sell antipersonnel mines;
Make sure that once a State joins, it fully implements the Mine Ban Treaty e.g. by submitting transparency reports, meeting deadlines for stockpile destruction and mine clearance, and assisting the victims of landmines;
Ensure that countries outside of the Mine Ban Treaty abide by the spirit of the agreement and refrain from use, production and stockpiling of the weapon;
Persuade non state actors to ban landmines and abide by the spirit of the treaty; and
Condemn any use or production by a state or non-state actor.

In fragile states, there is often an urgent need to establish a basic sense of order. Only after order has been achieved can the wider issues of safety and security be addressed. This continuum from disorder to order to safety and security is the essential starting point for justice and security delivery in fragile states. Cessation of ‘war’ is no ‘peace’. Sometime it is easier to win the war than maintain order and peace. We need to castigate the culprits-who so ever and for whatever reasons they used landmines and IEDs-to control the recurrence of such activities in future. If we do not punish the offenders today, they will repeat the same thing over repeatedly. We must campaign for ‘Zero Tolerance’ against the impunity.
The culture of societies influences the social behavior. Nepali societies are based on the moral and cultural values. Quite often, the victims of violence and crimes do not get proper treatment and support from their near and dear ones. It surprisingly saddened many participants (in one of the seminars) to hear one of the victims of land mines speak of her experiences of victimhood. She had lost one of her legs in the mine blast. She has incurred physical loss, at the same time her family was not supportive. The family members look her as an extra economic liability. There ought to be thousands of other victims who are facing similar types of problems. The victims of violence—especially sexual violence—are isolated, discriminated, insulted, and ‘socially excluded’. The family members take these victims as ‘extra burden’ a matter of shame and disgrace. If we really want to do some justice to these victims, we should offer them love, support, motivation, and opportunity rather than re-victimize them through stigma and ‘social exclusion’.



References:

ICBL Reports; http://www.icbl.org/lm/2006/nepal.html#fn2
Jody Williams, ICRC URL: http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JMM9
Mine Ban Treaty, 1997
NCBL. http://www.landminesnepal.org/
Stephen Goose, "The Economics of Landmines", article for UNIDIR Newsletter, published in early 1995, citing US Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, US Defense Intelligence Agency, et al, Landmine Warfare - Mines and Engineer Munitions in Southern Africa, May 1993
RAONLINE.http://www.raonline.ch/pages/story/np/mao15b0703.html
UN Report. http://www.un.org/av/photo/subjects/mines.htm
Kevin Clements, Towards a Sociology of Security, 1990, Conflict Research Consortium, Working paper 90-4, July 1990, University of Colorado, Boulder
Wæver, Ole. 1995. Securitization and Desecuritization. In On Security, edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz. New York: Columbia University Press.
Kanji, Omartio, Security, http://www.beyondcontractibility.org/essay/security/accessed on 18 Nov. 2007

[1] Dr. Thapa is a retired Additional Inspector General of Police. Currently he chairs the Centre for Security and Justice Studies, Nepal. He is a Research Fellow of SIRF/SNV Nepal. He is also Faculty and coordinator of Post Graduate Diploma in Security Management(PGDSM) course program in Kathmandu University, School of Management. He can be reached at dibrung@wlink.com.np